An Open Question To Moral Nihilists...

Just one question I always wanted to ask a moral nihilist.

Why wouldn't science apply to human ethics too. Science can help us build a better mouse trap, bake a better cake, fight a better war, etc. Shouldn't it help us find the best moral system.

Plus I'm guessing even moral nihilists think there's a moral system better than the rest. Mercy instead of cruelty? Love instead of hate? Happiness and well-being instead of hardship? And when is inflicting pain ever right? Because isn't pain always a horrible thing to go thru? Who ever says it's nice? Some people think it's sometimes necessary or unavoidable. But I've never heard anyone say it's nice or they enjoyed it.

See what I mean?

 

Moral nihilism (also known as ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong.

This is at odds with the eastern philosophical viewpoint that morality and ethics are sufficient in itself to guide a person to enlightenment or a state of wisdom and effortless bliss, as taught by enlightened masters like the Buddha, Rajini Menon and Anandamayi Ma.

Moral nihilism as a philosophy may have some value in certain contexts such as enabling us to shift away from entrenched values of an obsolete nature instilled by tradition and conditioning, to values which are more relevant at present or in a particular situation or circumstance. This of course requires critical thinking skills and exercise of proper judgement necessary to overcome the pull of former conditioning.

 

I'm not by any means a moral relativist, but I doubt that science is up to the job. Science is the gold standard of reliable human knowledge--achieved by rigorous testing of refutable hypotheses. But it's strength is also its limitation. Some subjects don't lend themselves to that approach, and value judgments are one of them. Scientists try to avoid them like the plague. So we must turn to moral philosophers, like Jeremy Bentham, and overconfident scientists venturing outside their fields like Sam Harris, for guidance in that area.

Some moral philosophers have thought otherwise. Jeremy Bentham, a leading eighteenth century proponent of the moral philosophy called Utilitarianism, thought morality could be reduced to hedonism: the pursuit of pleasure and pain. The moral course of action was that which caused the maximum amount of pleasure over pain for the greatest number of people. He thought that pleasure and pain were capable of being quantified by a process he called the Felicific calculus, an algorithm for calculating the degree or amount of happiness that a specific action is likely to cause. Things people liked and disliked were to be assigned weights according to their intensity, duration, certainty, immediacy, number of people affected, etc., and calculated on a one-person one vote basis. He made no distinction about quality; as he put it, poetry counted the same as pushpin--or, in modern terms, Shakespeare and Jerry Springer would be given equal weight, depending on a person's tastes. Seems reasonable.

So what's the problem? First of all, the part about quality. Bentham's younger disciple, John Stuart Mill thought that some kinds of pleasures were far more important for the welfare of humanity in the long run than others. He famously said he'd "rather be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." Then there's the problem of how the values of the individual factors are determined. Bentham left it to the judgment of government decision makers to assign numerical "utils' or units of measurement. And there are distribution issues: what if gains for majorities are made at the expense of minorities? And of course, the more basic problem of whether or not morality is what leads to the greatest happiness for the greatest number--as opposed to pleasing God, building character, etc. And of course, there is the perennial challenge of moral relativism. In our society, the Holocaust is generally regarded as morally horrific, but the Nazis liked it.

More recently, neuroscientist and atheist "Horseman" Sam Harris (in The Moral Landscape) has proposed a similar approach, which he calls a "science of morality" using fMRI technology. He recognizes that this is similar to classical utilitarianism, but supposedly differs from it in its concern for human welfare instead of just happiness, and being more "open-ended" in having an evolving definition of well-being. According to Harris, like Bentham, "good" is that which maximizes well-being" of sentient, conscious creatures. And science, he thinks, is fully capable of telling us what is conducive to their well-being. Science, of course, can't tell us what ought to be, only what is and can be. But Harris has told us what ought to be: the well-being of sentient, conscious creatures.

As was the case with Bentham, however, there are problems in his approach. Who decides, in particular cases of seemingly conflicting values, what the "objective" conclusion is? Apparently, Sam Harris. He derides "the over-educated atheistic moral nihilists and relativists who refuse to condemn as objectively wrong terrible atrocities like the genital mutilation of little girls. If only one person in the world held down a terrified, struggling, screaming little girl, cut off her genitals with a septic blade, and sewed her back up,...the only question would be how severely that person should be punished. What is not in question is that such a person has done something horribly, objectively wrong." But another utilitarian might easily conclude that the little girl should be sacrificed for the benefit of the "greatest number" in her society who think genital mutilation is the thing to do. in Facing Mount Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenyan anthropologist, accused mastermind of Mau Mau, and eventual President of Kenya (1964-78), waxed rapturous in defense of the traditional practice for his people, the Kikuyu. He defended it as vital to age grading, a tool for teaching endurance, and a battleground in the right of native peoples to practice their traditions. Harris' personal judgment somehow trumps theirs,--or more likely he thinks that "science knows best" that those folks would be better off without their silly and dangerous superstitions. A review in the New York Times remarks that "Harris ends up endorsing...something very like utilitarianism, a philosophical position that is now more than two centuries old...that faces a battery of familiar problems,' which Harris merely "push(es) aside." Science Knows Best (Published 2010) Science writer John Horgan, takes particular issue with Harris' faith in his own field of neuroscience as an engine for achieving moral clarity. "Neuroscience can't even tell me how I can know the big, black, hairy thing on my couch is my dog Merlin. And we're going to trust neuroscience to tell us how we should resolve debates over the morality of abortion, euthanasia and armed intervention in other nations' affairs?" Be wary of the righteous rationalist: We should reject Sam Harris's claim that science can be a moral guidepost

Good question though.

 

Just a remark.........nihilism(moral or otherwise) has very little todo with rejecting science or morality.......i might be somewhat of a nihilist(worldview/evolution).



Go with the flow.....negative or positive...

Mzzls

 

well i very much disagree with the concept as stated. not that i believe any name brand flavor of belief has the slightest idea what it is talking about morality either.
there is a practical meaning of good and evil. it has nothing to do with belief, but there sure is one.

anxieties and unpleasantness in life don't just happen, we don't do all of them to ourselves individually,
but statistically together, its not some big invisible personage in the sky doing it to our innocent selves either, we do.

this makes it really simple to define. yes productivity is nobel, and generousity is saintly, but morality is universal consideration, and logic in the service of universal consideration,
and evil, because aggressive inconsiderateness is at the root of nearly every anxiety and unpleasantness in life, is the lack there of.

and being a form of behavior and not an identity, it is a choice, and being a choice, no one needs to keep shaming themselves by choosing to be aggressively inconsiderate.
(and neither gender nor ideology are any good excuses either. ignorance maybe, if that's all one is surrounded by.
someone can't be entirely culpable for something they have no idea about,
not entirely maybe. the culture of the only times and places they know about when that is the case, however,
even then, those who think about things will be uncomfortable with what is familiar to them not feeling right, because of the resulting inconsistencies it demands they swallow whole.
its not that the so called right (which seem to me fascist wannabees) don't have access to sensible concepts, they just stand them on their head and apply them bassackwards.)