Agnostic Theism?

I'm really sorry you can't see my answer, from "He knew nothing". From my other statements, from my own definition (that it needs to be a justified truth, not a justified untruth), and even from my own Santa prank example, where I said "Do kids know Santa exists? Of course not." I think it's so obvious, it forces me to totally disbelieve your use of the word, "honesty", above.

My definitions aren't contradictory. All your example is doing is nit picking, as to what constitutes full justification of the truth, in the example...providing a presently impossible to pull off prank (fake rain coming from water hoses in the sky, covering blocks) to show your point. That's fine...doesn't matter. You have helped to show that a belief that something is justified and true, is, in fact, not knowledge. That even faulty and partial justifications force belief in untruths.

Even if it takes more than standing in rain for full justification, your argument says nothing about my definition of knowledge being justified truth. It's simply sidelining the discussion towards what constitutes full justification of the truth. You're just asking for a change to my rain statement, like this...

Yadda, yadda, yadda.....okay we get to what constitutes full justification.

You haven't taken up the X=? question and tried to show how a belief can come first, and then be justified true, after. You've helped show that mere belief that something is justified and true, isn't knowledge. Leaving only that knowledge is a truth, that is justified and believed.

Is that "believed" required in the definition?

Teaching is imparting knowledge. Learning is aquiring knowledge. And, belief can't be given or received. Belief is formed within the individual. Therefore, belief isn't a part of knowledge, when it's in transit. Evidence that belief shouldn't be part of the definition.

That we can have "books of knowledge" and "bodies of knowledge", and that books, or other mediums, don't have beliefs, is also evidence that belief shouldn't be part of the definition.

And, since justification process results in belief, it isn't needed in the definition. Belief can be a result of knowing, without needing to be included in the definition.


Peace

 

In fact, I did make an error in my last post. I used the form "it's" (contraction of "it is") when I should have used "its" (possessive form of "it"). Very sloppy. Next thing you know, I'll be confusing "they're" and "their". Now if you want to abandon apostrophes entirely, maybe you should start writing in German, nicht wahr? Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 5th ed., 1938, has a section on punctuation:

The apostrophe followed by an 's' is used to form the possessive of both singular nouns and plural nouns not ending in an 's' or 's' sound. (p. 1269)
​

Still you're better than average:

G, I get ur drift, U R So kooool, lol !!!!! (?)

 

3DJay, I am not saying that belief precedes knowledge, what I am saying is that knowledge is belief. That when you know something it entails that you believe it. As far as your "X=?" question, I actually did address this, though briefly. Essentially what you are saying is that X is something, and that you must first know what X is before you can believe it. Now let's think about this for a second. You are designating X as something which can be known. X, you would say, can be "God."

As I pointed out before, one does know that God. There is nothing to know in that statement. What you really mean is that one knows certain things about God. For example that God is Spirit, or omnipresent. But even still, what if God does not exist? If this is the case, then certainly one cannot know that God is Spirit, or God is omnipresent, because those would not be true propositions. I cannot know that the Earth is bigger then the Sun, but I can believe it is. So at the very least, with your "X=?" question, it is not necessary for one to know what X is, it is only necessary for him to have beliefs about what X is. In this instance "knowing," only amounts to believing, even false beliefs. This is why I said your definitions were contradictory, and why I was trying to work a more fundamental level, namely, what knowing amounts to—what it means to know that p. In the end, all you're really saying is that one must have beliefs. All I'm trying to get you do is to individuate between those beliefs which constitute knowledge and those that do not.

As of now, you seem to be saying that those beliefs that are both true and justified in some fashion are knowledge. "He knew nothing" I'm assuming referred to my two questions, and at the very least your answer to both those questions would be "no." According to my first question then, one cannot know what he does not believe. And by the second, one cannot know what is false. Is this correct so far? If not though, show me under what circumstances you could answer "yes" to either of my questions.

As for knowledge in transit. As I said before, books don't know things. Sure we may say that a book contains knowledge, but what you have to realize is that that is an equivocation of the word "knowledge." Just as when you say one must know what X is. If knowledge is belief, then impersonal entities do not know propositions. You can have a 75 volume book that has many truths in it, and is written in the langue "Babelish," but this book would be completely useless if no could read or write in "Bebelish."

As for justification is important. It is included in your analysis of knowledge, so it is important to define just what you mean by the term. I said it wasn't important for our discussion though because it can be very complex. My scenarios weren't meant to critique your jusitification; I was only using them to try and show that knowledge is at least true belief.

 

X can be any proposition, at all. X, I would say, can be "God is omnipotent, omniscient,...all his godly attributes."

You don't know that "God is", you know "(the definition of) God is". You have to know a definition of what God is, before the God exists question. If someone hasn't even imagined what God is, at all, they won't even consider its existence. There's no way to have any belief or knowledge about the proposition "X exists", without knowing the definition of X. There's no way to have any belief or knowledge about the proposition "X is", without knowing the definition of the attributes described, for X. There's no way to have any belief or knowledge of those attributes, without knowing the definition of the words that describe them. Etc. Etc. It's called infinite regress.

What? You know what the Sun and Earth are. You know that, from your perspective, the Earth looks bigger. That's your justification. It's the same as your fake rain example. It simply amounts to an inadequate justification process.

Show me how one can form a belief without any justification.

X = ?

I'll define the proposition after you form your belief as to whether it's true, or false.

I just showed how your example used prior knowledge. You've shown nothing contradictory, yet. You've yet to show how one can form a belief without justification.

Does a baby believe an electrical outlet is safe, before he sticks his finger in it? Or, does he simply have no belief about the electrical outlet? I'll be interested to find out how babies are born with beliefs, and how you know, if you answer yes, to the first.

I've been saying that truths that have been justified, are knowledge, and result in belief. Yes, the answer was "no".

Your first question ("Would you say that I knew it was raining outside, even though I believed otherwise?") lacks justification of the truth. It was a faulty justification. It shows that one cannot know an unjustified truth.

Your second question ("Or would you say that I knew it wasn't raining outside even though it really was raining?") lacks truth. And, no, you can't know what is false.

We disagree on the first question. All you did was create the necessity for more justification than simply standing in the rain. As I said, you were just forcing a change to my original statement, requiring more than just standing in the rain, to count as justification. Whatever lengths it takes to justify the truth, standing in justified true rain, would end up right back at my original statement.

How would you get the man, in the rain example, from not believing, to believing? Using a more thourough justification process. How else? Justification forces belief. You seem to be suggesting that he could somehow just jump to believing something to be true, from believing something to be false, with no process in between.

It is only an equivocation of the word "knowledge", if you add belief as part of the definition. It doesn't need to be. You still haven't shown why belief is a necessary part of the definition.

It's not. You've helped show that a belief that something is true, is, in fact, not knowledge. You've helped show that even a belief that something is justified and true, is, in fact, not knowledge.

As far as I can tell, you've only helped prove my point. Knowledge needs to be justified truth, at minimum. And, I still haven't seen the necessity to require belief as part of the definition. It's simply a result.


Peace

 

Well, I'm glad that X represents a proposition for you now. Before you seemed to have a problem with me saying that X was a proposition, and that we were dealing with propositional knowledge.

You don't have to "know" anything, you only have to believe something. This is all that you're saying.

Why does X no longer represent a proposition?

Does this apply to all words? For example when you say "X is" and "X exist" why is it not "X X"? Would he not also know what "exist" and "is" means?

Yes, infinite regresses can arise on the justification and meta-justificational levels. Is it possible, in your view, for one to know or believe anything at all?

Just fyi, I was only stating that one cannot know a false proposition; how he arrived at that belief was irrelevant. But I'm foregoing the whole knowledge question right now since, for whatever reason, we seemed to have reach the limits of our discussion. So with regard to your question, what amounts to an adequate justification?

I never claimed that at all. I never said that one can know or believe things without having other beliefs. In fact, I was never dealing with that at all. What I was trying to deal with is what S knowing that p amounts to. But like I said, that conversation has gone its course.

Again, I never made such a claim, what I was dealing with was what S knowing that p amount to.

Does a baby have beliefs about causation before hand? Does he know, before hand, that he can base belief X on belief Y?

On what basis does one form a belief about the law of contradiction? How could one non-circularly arrive at that proposition?

What amounts to an adequate justification? Is your belief that "truths that have been justified, are knowledge" itself an adequately justified truth? Do you know the definition of each word in that statement? What about the words you used to define those words and so on ad infintum.

What is an unfaulty justification? What does that look like exactly? Is your claim here itself based on a unfaulty justification?

I was finding a counter-example to your claim.

How can rain be true and justified? Is there such a thing as an unjustified false rain? The person in my scenario was actually standing in real rain. Can a table be true and justified? Explain.

And in this case the man believes that it is not raining, eventhough it is. So his "justification" forced his belief. Why is it faulty?

When have I suggested this? The only thing I was suggesting was that one cannot know what he does not believe. The man from my scenario didn't believe it was raining outside, so he could not know that it was raining outside. Knowledge entails belief.

One cannot know what he does not believe, and if one knows something he believes it. Knowledge entails belief. I think I have given you ample qualification for my claim.

What is truth, and how is it justified?

 

I didn't have a problem with a proposition. I was asking you to define God, first. I'm still asking that you define God first. I even gave it as my proposition. You seemed to have a problem with X representing God. You didn't think it was a proposition. And, apparently still don't.

Proposition: the definition of God is..... How is that not a proposition?

4. (Gram. & Logic) A complete sentence, or part of a sentence consisting of a subject and predicate united by a copula; a thought expressed or propounded in language; a from of speech in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject; as, snow is white.

You're wording it, proposition: X (God exists). And, I've said you need to know what the definition of God is, first. I'm wording it, propostition: X exists. And, I've said you need to know what the definition of X is, first. God is... X is... are both the same propositions.

Example: God, undefined, exists. Can you really form a belief without knowing what definition you are using, for God? Compared to the statements... God, as defined by Christians, exists. God, as defined by Jews, exists. God, as defined by Muslims, exists. God, as defined by.... etc. Don't you have to know what definition you are using, before forming your belief about existence? Even if you only believe that's the definition of "God", you know that's the definition of "God" you are using, in the proposition of existence.

A table. If I have no perception of what a table, or chair, is...never seen one, heard of one, etc...and someone gives me a partial/faulty definition...a table is a human construct that has 4 legs...I'll have a belief that a table is something with 4 legs. Knowing the definition I was given, if I'm then asked to pick out the tables, in a room full of 4 legged chairs and single post tables, I'll likely pick out all the chairs.

I may only believe a table is something with 4 legs, but I know that's the definition, I'm using, when asked to pick out the tables.

Let's say the definition of "God" is the standard Christian definition. I believe that's what is meant by "God". Knowing that's what I mean by "God", I believe "God" exists. Or, knowing that's what I mean by "God", I believe "God" doesn't exist. And, if I don't know what is meant by "God", I neither believe "God" exists, or doesn't exist.

Someone might have a totally different belief, if they know a different definition is being used.

Yes, for someone who doesn't know what "is", or "exist" mean, yes you'd need multiple variables. If someone states a proposition to you, in a language you totally don't understand, they're all Xs, aren't they? How would it not be that way?

Yes. Knowledge requires you to justify a truth. Belief just requires justification, of any proposition.

How he arrived at that belief, is not irrelevant. Justification is part of my freaking definition. Shall I just assume you like to call parts I have, and you have helped, shown valid evidence for, "irrelevant"?

You've been stating that 1. knowledge is a belief; and, 2. it's, at least, a true belief. You continuously leave justification out of it. You just called justification, irrelevant, above. Please, show me how it's so irrelevant, and form a belief, without justification.

You've already stated that knowledge needs to be a truth...part 1, of my definition. If you're admitting, now, that justification, comes before belief, then we're at part 2, of my definition.

All that's left is for you to show why belief is required as part 3 of the definition, instead of simply being left out, as a result. If justification is proving something true...and, you've proven a truth, true...then you, obviously, are forced to believe it's true. Belief is an unavoidable result, of knowing.

Are you, now, admitting that justification is required, prior to belief?

So there we have a blank slate. A baby has no beliefs, IMO. He experiences and learns things with his senses. It is exactly a blank slate that can show how truth, justified, causes belief. Instead of, a belief that is justified and true.

Working from a clean slate, no belief, position:

1. Truths exist, in reality, whether we've justified them, or not (e.g. Truth: when a tree falls in the woods, it makes a sound, even if nobody is around to hear it). Beliefs, on the other hand, don't exist, on their own. They can't exist outside individual minds.

2. Those existing truths can be justified (e.g. Justification: an audio recording can capture the sound of a tree falling, even if nobody is around to hear it). Since beliefs don't pre-exist justification, they can't be justified, using a blank slate.

3. Starting from a totally impartial, no-belief position, belief can only result from justification (e.g. Justification forces belief: listening to the audio recording, results in belief...and apparently the audio recording has contained an absolute truth and passed it on to me).

I've given the justifications, which resulted in my belief...

1. Some old "knowledge" has been proven wrong. It's obvious that it never was "knowledge", no matter how many people believed it was. Therefore, mere belief that something is justified and true, can't be knowledge.

2. Knowledge can be given and received. Belief can't be given and received. Therefore, belief can't be a part of knowledge, in transit.

3. A clean slate can't believe, prior to justification. People can't change beliefs, on a whim, only justification makes them change beliefs. Belief requires justification, first. It is a result of justification. And, only the truth counts as knowledge. Therefore, knowledge must be, at minimum, a justified truth.

Conclusion: Knowledge is, at minimum, a justified truth. Belief is not part of knowledge, in transit. Belief is not what makes a justified truth, true. Why is belief required in the definition of knowledge?

I'm not positive whether those justifications, indicate the truth, or not. It doesn't matter how strongly I believe it is a justified truth. If, in reality, it isn't true, then I don't know. However, I think you've helped show that my definition, is, at least, the minimum definition for knowledge. You just need to give some indication as to why belief is a required component, in the definition, instead of being a result.

I took a shortcut. I know the language I'm using is called English. And, I know there are books that define English words. Ahh, but I'm not sure how I aquired knowledge, from those books, since, according to you, books don't contain knowledge. But, if I stick to my definition, then, yes, I aquired knowledge, from books. Even still, if you make a proposition, I will, at least, need to regress back far enough to words I know the definition of.

If you make a proposition, in a totally different language, I won't be able to justify it, at all. Lacking justification, I'll have no belief, at all. Does that mean a justified truth written in a language nobody understands, isn't knowledge? No, it's still likely knowledge, it's just knowledge I can't possess, unless I somehow learn the language.

I don't know. So far, I haven't seen you show how it doesn't work. In fact, you helped show that justification is key. And, stated that truth is required. You have yet to show why belief is required, as part of the definition.

And, you took us into the realm of justification, with your claim.

You made it so he justified an untruth. He didn't justify that it was raining. He justified that it wasn't raining. It was not justified true rain, to him. The fact, of the truth, that rain is rain, doesn't matter. That is truth, alone, not a justified truth. It is not justified true rain.

Table = truth, if someone teaches me that it's a chair, then it is not a justified true table, to me. You might simply argue, that I don't believe it's a table. To which, I'll ask why don't I believe it's a table? The answer would seem to be the justification process...someone justified an untruth, to me.

How can illusion, justifying an untruth, not be considered faulty justification?

In general, don't we know what our senses tell us? If I see a table, and know what a table is, don't I know I'm looking at a table? However, if an illusionist creates a false image of a table, with mirrors, suddenly I don't know, that I'm only looking at a reflection of a table. I've been deceived, and have justified an untruth. Justified untruths, are not knowledge.

Such deceptions, or even errors, add to the requirements needed to justify a truth. Now, I might need to walk up, and touch the table, as well, to justify the truth. Some peoples senses might be broken, or abnormal, and might have to find other ways to justify things.

What you showed was that one cannot believe the truth, if it hasn't been justified, to you. Yet, you suggest that knowledge is, "at least", true belief. Leaving out justification, while still having a belief, seems to suggest you can have a belief, without justification. Meaning, he'd have the ability to just switch his beliefs, on a whim.

You've admitted truth is a requirement. If you're now admitting that justification is required, prior to belief, then the only difference we have, is why does belief need to be attached to the definition of knowledge? What's wrong with it simply being a result of knowing?

See, our first sentence, is basically the same. Because, you can't avoid a result and my second sentence would be belief is a result of knowledge. You have yet to show why belief is required in the definition. You helped prove that knowledge needs to be, at least, a justified truth.

Truth is reality. It is justified, when it's proven absolutely true. If what we believe is justified and true, is proven untrue, in the future, then we never knew what we thought we knew anyway. Once a truth is proven absolutely true, only then is it truly knowledge. Why is belief required as part of the definition?


Peace

 

3Djay in his humungous posts asks..

Why is belief required.?.

Well friend.
Have you been to pluto?
If you have not.
How do you factor it in to reality?

Fact.?
You have no fact.
You have anothers words that it exists

99.5% of all we say we know.. IS BELIEF.

Wake up

Occam

 

Ummm, I asked why it's required in the definition of knowledge. All you're suggesting is that I don't know Pluto exists, I only believe it exists. That doesn't answer my question.

What you don't know, is that I was just at Disney World, a few weeks ago, and saw Pluto myself.


Peace

 

If anyone ever defines God, I'll be shocked and stunned. It seems impossible considering the limited nature of human mindpower. God, if there was such a thing, must be something far beyond our puny mental powers ability to grasp, imho. It doesn't matter either way, since any God I could imagine would care little what one of us thought, or believed about God's existance, unless of course God was vain, insecure, or desperate for attention and praise.... an idea I just cannot see being the case. As for truth, I find the concept of absolutely true to be subjective, and never beyond the chance it someday may not be true any longer. If truth is at all a real concept, I see it as being personal, what is true for me is only true for me, and truth for another person is only so for them. If both truths agree, great, if not, that doesn't prove one is untrue, for we are all living separate lives, and are in our own unique reality. You are not here, I am not there, yet we are both right when wea are stating our different locations. If it is not true for me, it is not true. In my view, that is the case for each of our unique, personal realities.
Belief, in my view, is only relevent when discussing our 'best guess', our deductions about a subject, where we don't claim to be certain. If we feel certain, whether we are right or not, is a state I feel the word belief is not accurate to describe.

 

3DJay

Then it is not a fact?
You only believe it exists.

Occam

 

Bg13

Occam calls this fact.
Where ALL information verifies the proposition.
And no information can refute it.

Is this not what science calls fact?

And is it not the arrogance of science and the stupidity of man
to say an lone individual cannot state such as truth.

Who are the fools at the top of the pyramid to say the lowest,
the ones like occam with an IQ that thaey say is 'genius'.
cannot say what may be.?
Occam uses his so called 'genius' to do one thing.
Discredit the ethic/methods of the self proclaimed
elite. Greedy peeps with one agenda, themselves.

And to support without qualification the expansion of human though
and action into all areas. By all who can do so.

Occam

 

Sweet Jesus, I can't believe this thread is still going on.

Happy Easter.

 

Personally? I'd call it a fact, and say I know Pluto exists. It has been justified to me, by a number of teachers, books, and images. And, I haven't heard any valid claims that it doesn't exist...haven't heard any claims that it doesn't exist, for that matter.

Even if you can show that something I claim to know, is merely a belief, that has nothing to do with me asking why belief is part of knowledge.


Peace

 

3DJay

Because knowledge must have some definition.

Belief, can mostly be stated as fact.
If the belief is a cross refferenced result without apparent inconsistancy.
Fact can be knowledge.
By the same standard.
A hierarchy of understanding.

Yet
'I think therefore i 'am',
and thus 'a' reality exists to support the 'am'

Means ALL is SUSPECT.

Cool eh? Reality is a real wonderland for the philsopher/rationalist.

Occam

 

If what you think you know, isn't true, then you don't really know. Doesn't matter how much belief you put into it, you can't make an untruth, reality.

Before the "I" can "think", there needs to be a definition for "I".


Peace

 

I, personally, don't believe that statement as being correct.

One can be uneducated to modern conventions, i.e., language, labels and such, with only the skill necessary to survive or exist and they will "think" based on their moment-to-moment contact with their environment. Thinking is not a process where one needs to "define" anything as being "I", "me", or "my". Perception, consciousness and mental factors are the process which describe self identification without making a communicable defination out of it. "Defining", or breaking something down to a "defination of" a thing is more for verbal communication so that one can relate to others, not to the self. Identification with self does not require one to define anything outside themselves in order to define themselves.

IMO, "I", "me", "my", or self identification is nothing more than a perception of what is not you rather than a perception of what is you, but this is not to be taken as anything more than my own opinion. Even the body cannot be called the "I", the "me", or the "my" because when you loose a part of the body these things identified with self does not die or disappear at the separation. Rather the body, including all the parts that make up the body, as well as the brain, is being sensed as something outside of the identification with the self.

Identification of the self cannot be accurately defined as one cannot "see" or "directly experience" the self, only the things outside the self. So if you have a "definition" to apply to the self, one would only be defining the things outside the self.

"I think; therefore I am" is only a representation of what is going on based on the process of thinking. One can just as easily say "I exist because I have the capacity to think," or simply "because I think, I exist" and thinking is nothing more than a mental process of moment-to-moment contact with something outside the self which results in consciousness.

Before identification with self can be defined, there needs to be something there to define. Defining ones own mental factors, opinions, and concepts is not accurately defining a "self". but only functions of a thinking mind.

HTML:

 

I think I'll chime in about here, since the focus of the conversation seems to have switched to the matter of definitions.


Now, of course, not all terms have to be defined. Eventually, when an analysis is completed, we'll arrive at certain primitive, indefinable terms. For example,

"All bachelors are unmarried," is fully analysed as, "All unmarried men are unmarried." Since the proposition is now clearly analysed as an analytic truth, the analysis is complete. The terms "unmarried" and "man," then, stand in need of no definition.

Here's a better example, "if a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles," (http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/java/elements/bookI/bookI.html#posts).

This proposition is synthetic, but the terms "straight line" and "right angle" should be regarded as primitive.

Explanations have to end somewhere. An analysis is complete when we arrive at its primitive, indefinable terms. Plato broke the term "knowledge" down into its three constituative elements, "true, justified belief," just like I broke down the term "bachelor" into "unmarried man." Whether these terms are primitive and whether Plato's analysis is correct are different matters entirely. The terms one calls "primitive" is largely a matter of preference. One can either regard the term "point," "line," or both as primitive. But it is clear that not every term stands in need of a definition. "I," it seems to me, is such a term.

 

Yes, "I", however it is used, is self-defining.

 

That lyric from an ancient pop song is much like what I see as a probable likelihood.
'Yonder person, I am he.' 'You are one with God and I am one with God, therefor you and I are one with God.' I believe those are Hindu quotes.
I, me, and mine are inherently egocentric terms. If someones writing shows an abundance of pronouns like those, it often suggests that their views are self-important. It is good to read some of the accepting, liberal views written here. Like Occam's posting, 'Caring is the path.' It is similar to a quote by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama. 'My religion is kindness.'