Am I cuckoo or does anyone here also see a tenuous connection between existentialism and zen? 1) amorality 2) the absence of a definitive aim
I always wondered about the connection between these two as well. They both seem to stress the form, not the content of activity. Heidegger's "authenticity" and Sartre's "honesty" appear to be similar with zen's "being truely in the moment." This lack of content is a criticism that is often attached to existentialism; I can choose authentically to kill some one and there is no problem.
Thanks for your input, peacefulwind14. You seem to be more well-versed in Sartre than I (still struggling with Being and Nothingness). Could you explain to me what "transcendence" is? Does it bear any similarity to the zen idea (which is also present in some mystic Christian thinkers like Meister Eckhardt) of "direct experience" when the ego drops out of the picture and the moment contains all of consciousness. It's also similar to "unity in duality", meaning, moments of intense focus when the ego drops out and there is an "interpenetration of subjectivity and objectivity" (Sekida's words). Thanks.
I'd sum up Zen in 3 basic tenets (which have to be experienced directly rather than thought about rationally, however): 1) impermanence (which renders life "absurd" to use existentialist terminology); 2) unity in duality (a direct outshoot of impermanence: because our egos are impermanent and dynamic, the duality between self and other is illusory); 3) direct experience (also resonates with the existentialist skepticism toward reason: it is the state of mind when the ego drops out of the picture - transcendence? - due to intense concentration in the present moment or activity and there is an "interpenetration of subjectivity and objectivity" - Sekida's terminology);
"Transcendence" is a term that Husserl used. Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and was very influential on Sartre. Yet, when Husserl posited the idea of an ego, Sartre broke away from him. Sartre wanted to show that the ego was a transcendent object. What that means is that the ego, the object for consciousness (i.e. the object that consciousness is aware of) is not a part of consciousness. For example, when I look at my door, the door is the transcendent object of my awareness. Everytime I look at the door, I see the same transcendent object. Onjects are revealed in "profiles," which mean even if I see the door from a different angle, consciousness unifies all my experiences of the door and this kind of gives a history to the door (the transcendent object). This unifying action is an imminent (kind of the opposite of transcendent) structure of consciousness. It is not a object for consciousness but is what makes up conscious experience. Husserl posited in his later career the idea of an ego that is a permament structure within consciousness. Sartre rejects this. He says the ego is a transcendent object that is not a part of consciousness put is an object for consciousness. For example, Sartre says, as you agree (I've read some of your other posts), that there is no ego when one is performing an action. I don't say "I have to hit this tennis ball," there is only awareness of the tennis ball having to be hit. So Sartre says that the "I" comes only in reflection; only after the fact do I say "I did this..." Thus, Sartre says the ego is only a transcendent object. I admit that Zen got me into Sartre because of his ideas on the ego. But I don't believe that he thought there was no split between subject and object. Although Being is everywhere for Sartre, and nothing in-itself can be differentiated from anything else, for Sartre consciousness has to be split off from the object. Consciouness is always aware that it is not the object it is aware of. There is always "otherness." I think that Sartre would say a consciousness could never fully be "one" with its object; there would always be that fissure of nothingness, that otherness, that is consciousness.
Well, from my understanding, the for-itself nihilates the in-itself, meaning, it posits a "nothingness" between the for-itself and the in-itself. But the for-itself is the realm of the "other", am I wrong? There is no relational "otherness" in in-itself. It is non-positional being. The for-itself (which I think you're referring to here as the "consciousness [that] has to be split off from the object" in order for "transcendence" to occur) could easily be equated with what in zen is referred to as "the small mind" which sees itself as separate, individuated, and ultimately in a duality with the other, or the object. Albeit zen does equate the small mind with the ego. My question therefore is if there is a similarity between the concept of in-itself and the "Buddha mind", meaning, that which exists prior to consciousness (pre-reflexive cogito) and ego-centric consciousness (in zen, not Sartre). I already see the difference: for one, transcendence in Sartre seems to be exactly the opposite you would expect if you read the word in a zen text. In other words, transcendence is the process in which the for-itself posits the other. In zen it would probably mean, unity in duality - that is, when duality is transcended and there is the awareness of the "interpenetration of subject and object." "Nothingness" for Sartre also appears to be the opposite concept than that of zen and Meister Eckhardt's (even that of Max Stirner's/ there is also some resemblence to George Bataille's "heterogeneity" or "the sacred" but anyways). Nothingness in Sartre appears to be what creates "positionality", or duality in zen-speak, between the for-itself and the in-itself. In zen, of course, nothingness means the absence of duality/positionality. The other thing I'm unsure of is whether Sartre admits the possibility of "awareness" in the in-itself. In zen, Buddha mind, which I'm here trying to compare to in-itself is actually the highest form of awareness. Your posts seems to point to the fact that Sartre allows for some awareness in the in-itself, when you say "there is only the awareness of the tennis ball having to be hit." I think so, because of his use of the term "cogito", which is pre-reflexive, as opposite of the Cartesian cogito. Finally, I've questioned in the past the notion of "the absurd", which alongside nothingness, cogito, and transcendence, has a funny liason with zen. zen posits that "the only joy is in process", that ego-centric or goal-oriented thinking is futile. In other words, because goals are "meaningless", the individual can only find true fullfilment in the process of pursuing those goals. In my copy of Being and Nothingness the "Key to Special Terminology" defines "absurd" as such: "That which is meaningless. Thus man's existence is absurd because his contingency finds no external justification. His projects are absurd because they are directed toward an unattainable goal (the "desire to become God" or to be simultaneously the free For-itself and the absolute in-itself). That seems to deny the possibility in zen of becoming "one with Buddha." Further, zen explains the meaninglessness of human ambitions by emphasizing the impermanence of that which is desired. I've been trying to make a connection between Sartre's "temporality" and zen's "impermanence", but it is tenuous. Anyways, ultimately zen and Sartre diverge since the latter admits no prescription, and much less a solution to the "absurd." I was toying with the idea that the transcendence of ego would be such a thing, but apparently I was wrong. Unless, the pre-reflexive cogito is it, and, faithful to existentialist decor, it is simply not prescribed. But what is "authenticity" or "honesty" if not a prescription?
When I said consciousness always has an otherness, I meant it is always aware (implicitly) that it is not its object. It is conscious of the object. This is the non-positional consciousness, which, I think, is the same as the pre-refelctive cogito. There is no "otherness" in Being in-itself, meaning nothing is differentiated; only the for-itself does that. Consciousness experiences things as "this chair" which is distinct from this rug, etc. etc. Not sure what you mean. Being is always just there. Then the for-itself "nihilates" the in-itself and becomes aware of it. the pre-reflective cogito is being aware that one is aware of the object and not it implicitly; meaning you never have to say to yourself "I am not this object." Sartre also takes about non-reflective consciousness in the sense of what was talked about above (the-ball-having-to-be-hit). Reflecting on this brings the "I" I think this is the nature of the for-itself for Sartre. I think he would say that consciousness could never truly be one with the in-itself; that would make an in-itself-for-itself which he says is impossible. There has to be an otherness in the sense that consciousness doesn't believe it is the chair. Sartre would not allow any awareness in the in-itself. Awareness is strictly for the for-itself. The "tennis-ball-having-to-be-hit" is the for-itselfs understanding of the situation. It is all for-itself; what Sartre wanted to prove with this is that there is no "I" in the pre-reflective state. It only arises in relfection. "I tried to hit the ball." But the pre-reflective cogito is different from this. There is still a pre-relective cogito in "the-tennis-ball-having-to-be-hit." The for-itself knows it is not the ball. Then, when one reflects on the pre-reflective cogito, the "I" comes. Sorry this explanation is so convoluted. I think that is correct. Absolutely. Hedeigger especially says he isn't writing about ethics, but is discussing ontology. But doesn't it seem that they (H and Sartre) are putting value judgements on how we should live? Of course, they maintain that it is only the form of how we should live, not the content. We should live honestly/authentically but it doesn't matter what we do.
I like the idea of form vs. content of how one should lead one's life. I have myself thought of that. A life well-lived does have a basic structure, but within that structure there are myriad variations. I think our understanding of non-positionality is opposite. After reading some Sartre, my understanding is that the for-itself, in its aprehension of the object, nihilates the in-itself, and thus assumes a position in relation to it. Therefore, my undertanding is that the for-itself always requires positionality. And positionality implies the existence of the other. It is the in-itself which is non-positional.
